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In my (2017a), I defend a view I call Weak Scientism, which is the view that knowledge 
produced by scientific disciplines is better than knowledge produced by non-scientific 
disciplines. Scientific knowledge can be said to be quantitatively better than non-scientific 
knowledge insofar as scientific disciplines produce more impactful knowledge--in the form of 
scholarly publications--than non-scientific disciplines (as measured by research output and 
research impact). Scientific knowledge can be said to be qualitatively better than non-scientific 
knowledge insofar as such knowledge is explanatorily, instrumentally, and predictively more 
successful than non-scientific knowledge. 
 
Brown (2017a) raises several objections against my defense of Weak Scientism and I 
have replied to his objections (Mizrahi 2017b), thereby showing again that Weak Scientism is a 
defensible view. Since then, Brown (2017b) has reiterated his objections in another reply on 
SERRC. Almost unchanged from his previous attack on Weak Scientism (Brown 2017a), 
Brown’s (2017b) objections are the following: 
 
(1) Weak Scientism is not strong enough to count as scientism. 
(2) Advocates of Strong Scientism should not endorse Weak Scientism. 
(3) Weak Scientism does not show that philosophy is useless. 
(4) My defense of Weak Scientism appeals to controversial philosophical assumptions. 
(5) My defense of Weak Scientism is a philosophical argument. 
(6) There is nothing wrong with persuasive definitions of scientism. 
 
In what follows, I will respond to these objections, thereby showing once more that Weak 
Scientism is a defensible view. Since I have been asked to keep this as short as possible, 
however, I will try to focus on what I take to be new in Brown’s (2017b) latest attack on Weak 
Scientism. 
 
1. Is Weak Scientism strong enough to count as scientism? 
 
Brown (2017b) argues for (1) on the grounds that, on Weak Scientism, “philosophical 
knowledge may be nearly as valuable as scientific knowledge.” Brown (2017b, 4) goes on to 
characterize a view he labels “Scientism2,” which he admits is the same view as Strong 
Scientism, and says that “there is a huge logical gap between Strong Scientism (Scientism2) 
and Weak Scientism.” 
 
As was the case the first time Brown raised this objection, it is not clear how it is 
supposed to show that Weak Scientism is not “really” a (weaker) version of scientism (Mizrahi 
2017b, 10-11). Of course there is a logical gap between Strong Scientism and Weak Scientism; 
that is why I distinguish between these two epistemological views. If I am right, Strong Scientism 
is too strong to be a defensible version of scientism, whereas Weak Scientism is a defensible 
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(weaker) version of scientism (Mizrahi 2017a, 353-354). Of course Weak Scientism “leaves 
open the possibility that there is philosophical knowledge” (Brown 2017b, 5). If I am right, such 
philosophical knowledge would be inferior to scientific knowledge both quantitatively (in terms of 
research output and research impact) and qualitatively (in terms of explanatory, instrumental, 
and predictive success) (Mizrahi 2017a, 358). 
 
Brown (2017b, 5) does try to offer a reason “for thinking it strange that Weak Scientism 
counts as a species of scientism” in his latest attack on Weak Scientism, which does not appear 
in his previous attack. He invites us to imagine a theist who believes that “modern science is the 
greatest new intellectual achievement since the fifteenth century” (emphasis in original). Brown 
then claims that this theist would be an advocate of Weak Scientism because Brown (2017b, 6) 
takes “modern science is the greatest new intellectual achievement since the fifteenth century” 
to be “(roughly) equivalent to Weak Scientism.” For Brown (2017b, 6), however, “it seems odd, 
to say the least, that [this theist] should count as an advocate (even roughly) of scientism.” 
 
Unfortunately, Brown’s appeal to intuition is rather difficult to evaluate because his 
hypothetical case is under-described.1 First, the key phrase, namely, “modern science is the 
greatest new intellectual achievement since the fifteenth century,” is vague in more ways than 
one. I have no idea what “greatest” is supposed to mean here. Greatest in what respects? What 
are the other “intellectual achievements” relative to which science is said to be “the greatest”? 
Also, what does “intellectual achievement” mean here? There are multiple accounts and literary 
traditions in history and philosophy of science, science studies, and the like on what counts as 
“intellectual achievements” or progress in science (Mizrahi 2013b). Without a clear 
understanding of what these key phrases mean here, it is difficult to tell how Brown’s intuition 
about this hypothetical case is supposed to be a reason to think that Weak Scientism is not 
“really” a (weaker) version of scientism. 
 
Toward the end of his discussion of (1), Brown says something that suggests he actually 
has an issue with the word ‘scientism’. Brown (2017b, 6) writes, “perhaps Mizrahi should coin a 
new word for the position with respect to scientific knowledge and non-scientific forms of 
academic knowledge he wants to talk about” (emphasis in original). It should be clear, of 
course, that it does not matter what label I use for the view that “Of all the knowledge we have, 
scientific knowledge is the best knowledge” (Mizrahi 2017a, 354; emphasis in original). What 
matters is the content of the view, not the label. Whether Brown likes the label or not, Weak 
Scientism is a (weaker) version of scientism because it is the view that scientific ways of 
knowing are superior (in certain relevant respects) to non-scientific ways of knowing, whereas 
Strong Scientism is the view that scientific ways of knowing are the only ways of knowing. As I 
have pointed out in my previous reply to Brown, whether scientific ways of knowing are superior 
to non-scientific ways of knowing is essentially what the scientism debate is all about (Mizrahi 
2017b, 13). 
 
                                               
1 On why appeals to intuition are bad arguments, see Mizrahi (2012), (2013a), (2014), (2015a), (2015b), 
and (2015d). 
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Before I conclude this discussion of (1), I would like to point out that Brown seems to 
have misunderstood Weak Scientism. He (2017b, 3) claims that “Weak Scientism is a normative 
and not a descriptive claim.” This is a mistake. As a thesis (Peels 2017, 11), Weak Scientism is 
a descriptive claim about scientific knowledge in comparison to non-scientific knowledge. This 
should be clear provided that we keep in mind what it means to say that scientific knowledge is 
better than non-scientific knowledge. As I have argued in my (2017a), to say that scientific 
knowledge is quantitatively better than non-scientific knowledge is to say that there is a lot more 
scientific knowledge than non-scientific knowledge (as measured by research output) and that 
the impact of scientific knowledge is greater than that of non-scientific knowledge (as measured 
by research impact). To say that scientific knowledge is qualitatively better than non-scientific 
knowledge is to say that scientific knowledge is explanatorily, instrumentally, and predictively 
more successful than non-scientific knowledge. All these claims about the superiority of 
scientific knowledge to non-scientific knowledge are descriptive, not normative, claims. That is 
to say, Weak Scientism is the view that, as a matter of fact, knowledge produced by scientific 
fields of study is quantitatively (in terms of research output and research impact) and 
qualitatively (in terms of explanatory, instrumental, and predictive success) better than 
knowledge produced by non-scientific fields of study. 
 
Of course, Weak Scientism does have some normative implications. For instance, if 
scientific knowledge is indeed better than non-scientific knowledge, then, other things being 
equal, we should give more evidential weight to scientific knowledge than to non-scientific 
knowledge. For example, suppose that I am considering whether to vaccinate my child or not. 
On the one hand, I have scientific knowledge in the form of results from clinical trials according 
to which MMR vaccines are generally safe and effective. On the other hand, I have knowledge 
in the form of stories about children who were vaccinated and then began to display symptoms 
of autism. If Weak Scientism is true, and I want to make a decision based on the best available 
information, then I should give more evidential weight to the scientific knowledge about MMR 
vaccines than to the anecdotal knowledge about MMR vaccines simply because the former is 
scientific (i.e., knowledge obtained by means of the methods of science, such as clinical trials) 
and the latter is not. 
 
2. Should advocates of Strong Scientism endorse Weak Scientism? 
 
Brown (2017b, 7) argues for (2) on the grounds that “once the advocate of Strong Scientism 
sees that an advocate of Weak Scientism admits the possibility that there is real knowledge 
other than what is produced by the natural sciences [...] the advocate of Strong Scientism, at 
least given their philosophical presuppositions, will reject Weak Scientism out of hand.” It is not 
clear which “philosophical presuppositions” Brown is talking about here. Brown quotes 
Rosenberg (2011, 20), who claims that physics tells us what reality is like, presumably as an 
example of a proponent of Strong Scientism who would not endorse Weak Scientism. But it is 
not clear why Brown thinks that Rosenberg would “reject Weak Scientism out of hand” (Brown 
2017d, 7). 
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Like other proponents of scientism, Rosenberg should endorse Weak Scientism 
because, unlike Strong Scientism, Weak Scientism is a defensible view. Insofar as we should 
endorse the view that has the most evidence in its favor, Weak Scientism has more going for it 
than Strong Scientism does. For to show that Strong Scientism is true, one would have to show 
that no field of study other than scientific ones can produce knowledge. Of course, that is not 
easy to show. To show that Weak Scientism is true, one only needs to show that the knowledge 
produced in scientific fields of study is better (in certain relevant respects) than the knowledge 
produced in non-scientific fields. That is precisely what I show in my (2017a). I argue that the 
knowledge produced in scientific fields is quantitatively better than the knowledge produced in 
non-scientific fields because there is a lot more scientific knowledge than non-scientific 
knowledge (as measured by research output) and the former has a greater impact than the 
latter (as measured by research impact). I also argue that the knowledge produced in scientific 
fields is qualitatively better than knowledge produced in non-scientific fields because it is more 
explanatorily, instrumentally, and predictively successful. 
 
Contrary to what Brown (2017b, 7) seems to think, I do not have to show “that there is 
real knowledge other than scientific knowledge.” To defend Weak Scientism, all I have to show 
is that scientific knowledge is better (in certain relevant respects) than non-scientific knowledge. 
If anyone must argue for the claim that there is real knowledge other than scientific knowledge, 
it is Brown, for he wants to defend the value or usefulness of non-scientific knowledge, 
specifically, philosophical knowledge. 
 
It is important to emphasize the point about the ways in which scientific knowledge is 
quantitatively and qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge because it looks like Brown 
has confused the two. For he thinks that I justify my quantitative analysis of scholarly 
publications in scientific and non-scientific fields by “citing the precedent of epistemologists who 
often treat all items of knowledge as qualitatively the same” (Brown 2017b, 22; emphasis 
added). Here Brown fails to carefully distinguish between my claim that scientific knowledge is 
quantitatively better than non-scientific knowledge and my claim that scientific knowledge is 
qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge. For the purposes of a quantitative study of 
knowledge, information and data scientists can do precisely what epistemologists do and 
“abstract from various circumstances (by employing variables)” (Brown 2017b, 22) in order to 
determine which knowledge is quantitatively better. 
 
3. How is Weak Scientism relevant to the claim that philosophy is useless? 
 
Brown (2017b, 7-8) argues for (3) on the grounds that “Weak Scientism itself implies nothing 
about the degree to which philosophical knowledge is valuable or useful other than stating 
scientific knowledge is better than philosophical knowledge” (emphasis in original). 
 
Strictly speaking, Brown is wrong about this because Weak Scientism does imply 
something about the degree to which scientific knowledge is better than philosophical 
knowledge. Recall that to say that scientific knowledge is quantitatively better than non-scientific 
knowledge is to say that scientific fields of study publish more research and that scientific 
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research has greater impact than the research published in non-scientific fields of study. 
Contrary to what Brown seems to think, we can say to what degree scientific research is 
superior to non-scientific research in terms of output and impact. That is precisely what 
bibliometric indicators like h-index and other metrics are for (Rousseau et al. 2018). Such 
bibliometric indicators allow us to say how many articles are published in a given field, how 
many of those published articles are cited, and how many times they are cited. For instance, 
according to Scimago Journal & Country Rank (2018), which contains data from the Scopus 
database, of the 3,815 Philosophy articles published in the United States in 2016-2017, 
approximately 14% are cited, and their h-index is approximately 160. On the other hand, of the 
24,378 Psychology articles published in the United States in 2016-2017, approximately 40% are 
cited, and their h-index is approximately 640. Contrary to what Brown seems to think, then, we 
can say to what degree research in Psychology is better than research in Philosophy in terms of 
research output (i.e., number of publications) and research impact (i.e., number of citations). We 
can use the same bibliometric indicators and metrics to compare research in other scientific and 
non-scientific fields of study. 
 
As I have already said in my previous reply to Brown, “Weak Scientism does not entail 
that philosophy is useless” and “I have no interest in defending the charge that philosophy is 
useless” (Mizrahi 2017b, 11-12). So, I am not sure why Brown brings up (3) again. Since he 
insists, however, let me explain why philosophers who are concerned about the charge that 
philosophy is useless should engage with Weak Scientism as well. Suppose that a foundation or 
agency is considering whether to give a substantial grant to one of two projects. The first project 
is that of a philosopher who will sit in her armchair and contemplate the nature of friendship.2 
The second project is that of a team of social scientists who will conduct a longitudinal study of 
the effects of friendship on human well-being (e.g., Yang et al. 2016). If Weak Scientism is true, 
and the foundation or agency wants to fund the project that is likely to yield better results, then it 
should give the grant to the team of social scientists rather than to the armchair philosopher 
simply because the former’s project is scientific, whereas the latter’s is not. This is because the 
scientific project will more likely yield better knowledge than the non-scientific project will. In 
other words, unlike the project of the armchair philosopher, the scientific project will probably 
produce more research (i.e., more publications) that will have a greater impact (i.e., more 
citations) and the knowledge produced will be explanatorily, instrumentally, and predictively 
more successful than any knowledge that the philosopher’s project might produce. 
 
This example should really hit home for Brown, since reading his latest attack on Weak 
Scientism gives one the impression that he thinks of philosophy as a personal, “self-
improvement” kind of enterprise, rather than an academic discipline or field of study. For 
instance, he seems to be saying that philosophy is not in the business of producing “new 
knowledge” or making “discoveries” (Brown 2017b, 17). Rather, Brown (2017b, 18) suggests 
that philosophy “is more about individual intellectual progress rather than collective intellectual 
progress.” Individual progress or self-improvement is great, of course, but I am not sure that it 
helps Brown’s case in defense of philosophy against what he sees as “the menace of 
                                               
2 I use friendship as an example here because Brown (2017b, 31) uses it as an example of philosophical 
knowledge. I will say more about that in Section 6. 
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scientism.” For this line of thinking simply adds fuel to the fire set by those who want to see 
philosophy burn. As I point out in my (2017a), scientists who dismiss philosophy do so because 
they find it academically useless. 
 
For instance, Hawking and Mlodinow (2010, 5) write that ‘philosophy is dead’ because it 
‘has not kept up with developments in science, particularly physics’ (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Weinberg (1994, 168) says that, as a working scientist, he ‘finds no help in 
professional philosophy’ (emphasis added). (Mizrahi 2017a, 356) 
 
Likewise, Richard Feynman is rumored to have said that “philosophy of science is about as 
useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds” (Kitcher 1998, 32). It is clear, then, that what these 
scientists complain about is professional or academic philosophy. Accordingly, they would have 
no problem with anyone who wants to pursue philosophy for the sake of “individual intellectual 
progress.” But that is not the issue here. Rather, the issue is academic knowledge or research. 
 
4. Does my defense of Weak Scientism appeal to controversial philosophical 
assumptions? 
 
Brown (2017b, 9) argues for (4) on the grounds that I assume that “we are supposed to privilege 
empirical (I read Mizrahi’s ‘empirical’ here as ‘experimental/scientific’) evidence over non-
empirical evidence.” But that is question-begging, Brown claims, since he takes me to be 
assuming something like the following: “If the question of whether scientific knowledge is 
superior to [academic] non-scientific knowledge is a question that one can answer empirically, 
then, in order to pose a serious challenge to my [Mizrahi’s] defense of Weak Scientism, Brown 
must come up with more than mere ‘what ifs’” (Mizrahi 2017b, 10; quoted in Brown 2017b, 8). 
 
This objection seems to involve a confusion about how defeasible reasoning and 
defeating evidence are supposed to work. Given that “a rebutting defeater is evidence which 
prevents E from justifying belief in H by supporting not-H in a more direct way” (Kelly 2016), 
claims about what is actual cannot be defeated by mere possibilities, since claims of the form 
“Possibly, p” do not prevent a piece of evidence from justifying belief in “Actually, p” by 
supporting “Actually, not-p” directly. For example, the claim “Hillary Clinton could have been the 
45th President of the United States” does not prevent my perceptual and testimonial evidence 
from justifying my belief in “Donald Trump is the 45th President of the United States,” since the 
former does not support “It is not the case that Donald Trump is the 45th President of the United 
States” in a direct way. In general, claims of the form “Possibly, p” are not rebutting defeaters 
against claims of the form “Actually, p.” Defeating evidence against claims of the form “Actually, 
p” must be about what is actual (or at least probable), not what is merely possible, in order to 
support “Actually, not-p” directly. 
 
For this reason, although “the production of some sorts of non-scientific knowledge work 
may be harder than the production of scientific knowledge” (Brown 2017b, 19), Brown gives no 
reasons to think that it is actually or probably harder, which is why this possibility does nothing 
to undermine the claim that scientific knowledge is actually better than non-scientific knowledge. 
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Just as it is possible that philosophical knowledge is harder to produce than scientific 
knowledge, it is also possible that scientific knowledge is harder to produce than philosophical 
knowledge. It is also possible that scientific and non-scientific knowledge are equally hard to 
produce. Similarly, the possibility that “a little knowledge about the noblest things is more 
desirable than a lot of knowledge about less noble things” (Brown 2017b, 19), whatever “noble” 
is supposed to mean here, does not prevent my bibliometric evidence (in terms of research 
output and research impact) from justifying the belief that scientific knowledge is better than 
non-scientific knowledge. Just as it is possible that philosophical knowledge is “nobler” 
(whatever that means) than scientific knowledge, it is also possible that scientific knowledge is 
“nobler” than philosophical knowledge or that they are equally “noble” (Mizrahi 2017b, 9-10). 
 
In fact, even if Brown (2017a, 47) is right that “philosophy is harder than science” and 
that “knowing something about human persons--particularly qua embodied rational being--is a 
nobler piece of knowledge than knowing something about any non-rational object” (Brown 
2017b, 21), whatever “noble” is supposed to mean here, it would still be the case that scientific 
fields produce more knowledge (as measured by research output), and more impactful 
knowledge (as measured by research impact), than non-scientific disciplines. So, I am not sure 
why Brown keeps insisting on mentioning these mere possibilities. He also seems to forget that 
the natural and social sciences study human persons as well. Even if knowledge about human 
persons is “nobler” (whatever that means), there is a lot of scientific knowledge about human 
persons coming from scientific fields, such as anthropology, biology, genetics, medical science, 
neuroscience, physiology, psychology, and sociology, to name just a few. 
 
One of the alleged “controversial philosophical assumptions” that my defense of Weak 
Scientism rests on, and that Brown (2017a) complains about the most in his previous attack on 
Weak Scientism, is my characterization of philosophy as the scholarly work that professional 
philosophers do. In my previous reply, I argue that Brown is not in a position to complain that 
this is a “controversial philosophical assumption,” since he rejects my characterization of 
philosophy as the scholarly work that professional philosophers produce, but he does not tell us 
what counts as philosophical (Mizrahi 2017b, 13). Well, it turns out that Brown does not reject 
my characterization of philosophy after all. For, after he was challenged to say what counts as 
philosophical, he came up with the following “sufficient condition for pieces of writing and 
discourse that count as philosophy” (Brown 2017b, 11): 
 
(P) Those articles published in philosophical journals and what academics with a Ph.D. 
in philosophy teach in courses at public universities with titles such as Introduction to 
Philosophy, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Normative Ethics, and Philosophy of Science 
(Brown 2017b, 11; emphasis added). 
 
Clearly, this is my characterization of philosophy in terms of the scholarly work that professional 
philosophers produce. Brown simply adds teaching to it. Since he admits that “scientists teach 
students too” (Brown 2017b, 18), however, it is not clear how adding teaching to my 
characterization of philosophy is supposed to support his attack on Weak Scientism. In fact, it 
may actually undermine his attack on Weak Scientism, since there is a lot more teaching going 
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on in STEM fields than in non-STEM fields. According to data from the National Center for 
Education Statistics (2017), in the 2015-16 academic year, post-secondary institutions in the 
United States conferred only 10,157 Bachelor’s degrees in philosophy and religious studies 
compared to 113,749 Bachelor’s degrees in biological and biomedical sciences, 106,850 
Bachelor’s degrees in engineering, and 117,440 in psychology. In general, in the 2015-2016 
academic year, 53.3% of the Bachelor’s degrees conferred by post-secondary institutions in the 
United States were degrees in STEM fields, whereas only 5.5% of conferred Bachelor’s degrees 
were in the humanities (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Bachelor’s degrees conferred by post-secondary institutions in the US, by field of 
study, 2015-2016 (Source: NCES) 
 
 
 
Clearly, then, there is a lot more teaching going on in science than in philosophy (or even in the 
humanities in general), since a lot more students take science courses and graduate with 
degrees in scientific fields of study. So, even if Brown is right that we should include teaching in 
what counts as philosophy, it is still the case that scientific fields are quantitatively better than 
non-scientific fields. 
 
Since Brown (2017b, 13) seems to agree that philosophy (at least in part) is the 
scholarly work that academic philosophers produce, it is peculiar that he complains, without 
argument, that “an understanding of philosophy and knowledge as operational is [...] shallow 
insofar as philosophy and knowledge can't fit into the narrow parameters of another empirical 
study.” Once Brown (2017b, 11) grants that “Those articles published in philosophical journals” 
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count as philosophy, he thereby also grants that these journal articles can be studied empirically 
using the methods of bibliometrics, information science, or data science. That is, Brown (2017b, 
11) concedes that philosophy consists (at least in part) of “articles published in philosophical 
journals,” and so these articles can be compared to other articles published in science journals 
to determine research output, and they can also be compared to articles published in science 
journals in terms of citation counts to determine research impact. What exactly is “shallow” 
about that? Brown does not say. 
 
A, perhaps unintended, consequence of Brown’s (P) is that the “great thinkers from the 
past” (Brown 2017b, 18), those that Brown (2017b, 13) likes to remind us “were not professional 
philosophers,” did not do philosophy, by Brown’s own lights. For “Socrates, Plato, Augustine, 
Descartes, Locke, and Hume” (Brown 2017b, 13) did not publish in philosophy journals, were 
not academics with a Ph.D. in philosophy, and did not teach at public universities courses “with 
titles such as Introduction to Philosophy, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Normative Ethics, and 
Philosophy of Science” (Brown 2017b, 11). 
 
Another peculiar thing about Brown’s (P) is the restriction of the philosophical to what is 
being taught in public universities. What about community colleges and private universities? Is 
Brown suggesting that philosophy courses taught at private universities do not count as 
philosophy courses? This is peculiar, especially in light of the fact that, at least according to The 
Philosophical Gourmet Report (Brogaard and Pynes 2018), the top ranked philosophy programs 
in the United States are mostly located in private universities, such as New York University and 
Princeton University. 
 
5. Is my defense of Weak Scientism a scientific or a philosophical argument? 
 
Brown argues for (5) on the grounds that my (2017a) is published in a philosophy journal, 
namely, Social Epistemology, and so it a piece of philosophical knowledge by my lights, since I 
count as philosophy the research articles that are published in philosophy journals. 
 
Brown would be correct about this if Social Epistemology were a philosophy journal. But 
it is not. Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy is an interdisciplinary 
journal. The journal’s “aim and scope” statement makes it clear that Social Epistemology is an 
interdisciplinary journal: 
 
Social Epistemology provides a forum for philosophical and social scientific enquiry that 
incorporates the work of scholars from a variety of disciplines who share a concern with 
the production, assessment and validation of knowledge. The journal covers both 
empirical research into the origination and transmission of knowledge and normative 
considerations which arise as such research is implemented, serving as a guide for 
directing contemporary knowledge enterprises (Social Epistemology 2018). 
 
The fact that Social Epistemology is an interdisciplinary journal, with contributions from 
“Philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, cultural historians, social studies of science 
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researchers, [and] educators” (Social Epistemology 2018) would not surprise anyone who is 
familiar with the history of the journal. The founding editor of the journal is Steve Fuller, who was 
trained in an interdisciplinary field, namely, History and Philosophy of Science (HPS), and is 
currently the Auguste Comte Chair in Social Epistemology in the Department of Sociology at 
Warwick University. Brown (2017b, 15) would surely agree that sociology is not philosophy, 
given that, for him, “cataloguing what a certain group of people believes is sociology and not 
philosophy.” The current executive editor of the journal is James H. Collier, who is a professor of 
Science and Technology in Society at Virginia Tech, and who was trained in Science and 
Technology Studies (STS), which is an interdisciplinary field as well. 
 
Brown asserts without argument that the methods of a scientific field of study, such as 
sociology, are different in kind from those of philosophy: “What I contend is that [...] 
philosophical methods are different in kind from those of the experimental scientists [sciences?]” 
(Brown 2017b, 24). He then goes on to speculate about what it means to say that an 
explanation is testable (Brown 2017b, 25). What Brown comes up with is rather unclear to me. 
For instance, I have no idea what it means to evaluate an explanation by inductive 
generalization (Brown 2017b, 25). Instead, Brown should have consulted any one of the logic 
and reasoning textbooks I keep referring to in my (2017a) and (2017b) to find out that it is 
generally accepted among philosophers that the good-making properties of explanations, 
philosophical and otherwise, include testability among other good-making properties (see, e.g., 
Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin 2010, 257). As far as testability is concerned, to test an 
explanation or hypothesis is to determine “whether predictions that follow from it are true” 
(Salmon 2013, 255). In other words, “To say that a hypothesis is testable is at least to say that 
some prediction made on the basis of that hypothesis may confirm or disconfirm it” (Copi et al. 
2011, 515). 
 
For this reason, Feser’s analogy according to which “to compare the epistemic values of 
science and philosophy and fault philosophy for not being good at making testable predications 
[sic] is like comparing metal detectors and gardening tools and concluding gardening tools are 
not as good as metal detectors because gardening tools do not allow us to successfully detect 
for metal” (Brown 2017b, 25), which Brown likes to refer to (Brown 2017a, 48), is inapt. It is not 
an apt analogy because, unlike metal detectors and gardening tools, which serve different 
purposes, both science and philosophy are in the business of explaining things. Indeed, Brown 
admits that, like good scientific explanations, “good philosophical theories explain things” 
(emphasis in original). In other words, Brown admits that both scientific and philosophical 
theories are instruments of explanation (unlike gardening and metal-detecting instruments). To 
provide good explanations, then, both scientific and philosophical theories must be testable 
(Mizrahi 2017b, 19-20). 
 
6. What is wrong with persuasive definitions of scientism? 
 
Brown (2017b, 31) argues for (6) on the grounds that “persuasive definitions are [not] always 
dialectically pernicious.” He offers an argument whose conclusion is “abortion is murder” as an 
example of an argument for a persuasive definition of abortion. He then outlines an argument 
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for a persuasive definition of scientism according to which “Weak Scientism is a view that has its 
advocates putting too high a value on scientific knowledge” (Brown 2017b, 32). 
 
The problem, however, is that Brown is confounding arguments for a definition with the 
definition itself. Having an argument for a persuasive definition does not change the fact that it is 
a persuasive definition. To illustrate this point, let me give an example that I think Brown will 
appreciate. Suppose I define theism as an irrational belief in the existence of God. That is, 
“theism” means “an irrational belief in the existence of God.” I can also provide an argument for 
this definition: 
 
P1: If it is irrational to have paradoxical beliefs and God is a paradoxical being, then 
theism is an irrational belief in the existence of God. 
P2: It is irrational to have paradoxical beliefs and God is a paradoxical being (e.g., the 
omnipotence paradox).3 
Therefore, 
C: Theism is an irrational belief in the existence of God. 
 
But surely, theists will complain that my definition of theism is a “dialectically pernicious” 
persuasive definition. For it stacks the deck against theists. It states that theists are already 
making a mistake, by definition, simply by believing in the existence of God. Even though I have 
provided an argument for this persuasive definition of theism, my definition is still a persuasive 
definition of theism, and my argument is unlikely to convince anyone who doesn’t already think 
that theism is irrational. Indeed, Brown (2017b, 30) himself admits that much when he says 
“good luck with that project!” about trying to construct a sound argument for “abortion is murder.” 
I take this to mean that pro-choice advocates would find his argument for “abortion is murder” 
dialectically inert precisely because it defines abortion in a manner that transfers “emotive force” 
(Salmon 2013, 65), which they cannot accept. Likewise, theists would find the argument above 
dialectically inert precisely because it defines theism in a manner that transfers “emotive force” 
(Salmon 2013, 65), which they cannot accept. In other words, Brown seems to agree that there 
are good dialectical reasons to avoid appealing to persuasive definitions. Therefore, like 
“abortion is murder,” “theism is an irrational belief in the existence of God,” and “‘Homosexual’ 
means ‘one who has an unnatural desire for those of the same sex’” (Salmon 2013, 65), “Weak 
Scientism is a view that has its advocates putting too high a value on scientific knowledge” 
(Brown 2017b, 32) is a “dialectically pernicious” persuasive definition (cf. Williams 2015, 14). 
Like persuasive definitions in general, it “masquerades as an honest assignment of meaning to 
a term while condemning or blessing with approval the subject matter of the definiendum” 
(Hurley 2015, 101). As I have pointed out in my (2017a), the problem with such definitions is 
that they “are strategies consisting in presupposing an unaccepted definition, taking a new 
unknowable description of meaning as if it were commonly shared” (Macagno and Walton 2014, 
205). 
 
                                               
3 For more on paradoxes involving the divine attributes, see Mizrahi (2013c). 
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As for Brown’s argument for the persuasive definition of Weak Scientism, according to 
which it “is a view that has its advocates putting too high a value on scientific knowledge” 
(Brown 2017b, 32), a key premise in this argument is the claim that there is a piece of 
philosophical knowledge that is better than scientific knowledge. This is premise 36 in Brown’s 
argument: 
 
Some philosophers qua philosophers know that (a) true friendship is a necessary 
condition for human flourishing and (b) the possession of the moral virtues or a life 
project aimed at developing the moral virtues is a necessary condition for true friendship 
and (c) (therefore) the possession of the moral virtues or a life project aimed at 
developing the moral virtues is a necessary condition for human flourishing (see, e.g., 
the arguments in Plato’s Gorgias) and knowledge concerning the necessary conditions 
of human flourishing is better than any sort of scientific knowledge (see, e.g., St. 
Augustine’s Confessions, book five, chapters iii and iv) [assumption] 
 
There is a lot to unpack here, but I will focus on what I take to be the points most relevant to the 
scientism debate. First, Brown assumes 36 without argument, but why think it is true? In 
particular, why think that (a), (b), and (c) count as philosophical knowledge? Brown says that 
philosophers know (a), (b), and (c) in virtue of being philosophers, but he does not tell us why 
that is the case. After all, accounts of friendship, with lessons about the significance of 
friendship, predate philosophy (see, e.g., the friendship of Gilgamesh and Enkidu in The Epic of 
Gilgamesh). Did it really take Plato and Augustine to tell us about the significance of friendship? 
In fact, on Brown’s characterization of philosophy, namely, (P), (a), (b), and (c) do not count as 
philosophical knowledge at all, since Plato and Augustine did not publish in philosophy journals, 
were not academics with a Ph.D. in philosophy, and did not teach at public universities courses 
“with titles such as Introduction to Philosophy, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Normative Ethics, 
and Philosophy of Science” (Brown 2017b, 11). 
 
Second, some philosophers, like Epicurus, need (and think that others need) friends to 
flourish, whereas others, like Diogenes of Sinope, need no one. For Diogenes, friends will only 
interrupt his sunbathing (Arrian VII.2). My point is not simply that philosophers disagree about 
the value of friendship and human flourishing. Of course they disagree.4 Rather, my point is that, 
in order to establish general truths about human beings, such as “Human beings need friends to 
flourish,” one must employ the methods of science, such as randomization and sampling 
procedures, blinding protocols, methods of statistical analysis, and the like; otherwise, one 
would simply commit the fallacies of cherry-picking anecdotal evidence and hasty generalization 
(Salmon 2013, 149-151). After all, the claim “Some need friends to flourish” does not 
necessitate, or even make more probable, the truth of “Human beings need friends to flourish.”5 
 
Third, why think that “knowledge concerning the necessary conditions of human 
flourishing is better than any sort of scientific knowledge” (Brown 2017b, 32)? Better in what 
                                               
4 “Friendship is unnecessary, like philosophy, like art, like the universe itself (for God did not need to 
create)” (Lewis 1960, 71). 
5 On fallacious inductive reasoning in philosophy, see Mizrahi (2013d), (2015c), (2016), and (2017c). 
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sense? Quantitatively? Qualitatively? Brown does not tell us. He simply declares it “self-evident” 
(Brown 2017b, 32). I take it that Brown would not want to argue that “knowledge concerning the 
necessary conditions of human flourishing” is better than scientific knowledge in the quantitative 
(i.e., in terms of research output and research impact) and qualitative (i.e., in terms of 
explanatory, instrumental, and predictive success) respects in which scientific knowledge is 
better than non-scientific knowledge, according to Weak Scientism. If so, then in what sense 
exactly “knowledge concerning the necessary conditions of human flourishing” (Brown 2017b, 
32) is supposed to be better than scientific knowledge? Brown (2017b, 32) simply assumes that 
without argument and without telling us in what sense exactly “knowledge concerning the 
necessary conditions of human flourishing is better than any sort of scientific knowledge” 
(Brown 2017b, 32). 
 
Of course, philosophy does not have a monopoly on friendship and human flourishing as 
research topics. Psychologists and sociologists, among other scientists, work on friendship as 
well (see, e.g., Hojjat and Moyer 2017). To get an idea of how much research on friendship is 
done in scientific fields, such as psychology and sociology, and how much is done in 
philosophy, we can use a database like Web of Science. Currently (03/29/2018), there are 
12,334 records in Web of Science on the topic “friendship.” Only 76 of these records (0.61%) 
are from the Philosophy research area. Most of the records are from the Psychology (5,331 
records) and Sociology (1,111) research areas (43.22% and 9%, respectively). As we can see 
from Figure 2, most of the research on friendship is done in scientific fields of study, such as 
psychology, sociology, and other social sciences. 
 
Figure 2. Number of records on the topic “friendship” in Web of Science by research area 
(Source: Web of Science) 
 
 
 
In terms of research impact, too, scientific knowledge about friendship is superior to 
philosophical knowledge about friendship. According to Web of Science, the average citations 
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per year for Psychology research articles on the topic of friendship is 2826.11 (h-index is 148 
and the average citations per item is 28.1), and the average citations per year for Sociology 
research articles on the topic of friendship is 644.10 (h-index is 86 and the average citations per 
item is 30.15), whereas the average citations per year for Philosophy research articles on 
friendship is 15.02 (h-index is 13 and the average citations per item is 8.11). Quantitatively, 
then, psychological and sociological knowledge on friendship is better than philosophical 
knowledge in terms of research output and research impact. Both Psychology and Sociology 
produce significantly more research on friendship than Philosophy does, and the research they 
produce has significantly more impact (as measured by citation counts) than philosophical 
research on the same topic. 
 
Qualitatively, too, psychological and sociological knowledge about friendship is better 
than philosophical knowledge about friendship. For, instead of rather vague statements about 
how “true friendship is a necessary condition for human flourishing” (Brown 2017b, 32) that are 
based on mostly armchair speculation, psychological and sociological research on friendship 
provides detailed explanations and accurate predictions about the effects of friendship (or lack 
thereof) on human well-being. For instance, numerous studies provide evidence for the effects 
of friendships or lack of friendships on physical well-being (see, e.g., Yang et al. 2016) as well 
as mental well-being (see, e.g., Cacioppo and Patrick 2008). Further studies provide 
explanations for the biological and genetic bases of these effects (Cole et al. 2011). This 
knowledge, in turn, informs interventions designed to help people deal with loneliness and social 
isolation (see, e.g., Masi et al. 2010).6 
 
To sum up, Brown (2017b, 32) has given no reasons to think that “knowledge 
concerning the necessary conditions of human flourishing is better than any sort of scientific 
knowledge.” He does not even tell us what “better” is supposed to mean here. He also ignores 
the fact that scientific fields of study, such as psychology and sociology, produce plenty of 
knowledge about human flourishing, both physical and mental well-being. In fact, as we have 
seen, science produces a lot more knowledge about topics related to human well-being, such as 
friendship, than philosophy does. For this reason, Brown (2017b, 32) has failed to show that 
“there is non-scientific form of knowledge better than scientific knowledge.” 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
At this point, I think it is quite clear that Brown and I are talking past each other on a couple of 
levels. First, I follow scientists (e.g., Weinberg 1994, 166-190) and philosophers (e.g., Haack 
2007, 17-18 and Peels 2016, 2462) on both sides of the scientism debate in treating philosophy 
as an academic discipline or field of study, whereas Brown (2017b, 18) insists on thinking about 
philosophy as a personal activity of “individual intellectual progress.” Second, I follow scientists 
(e.g., Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, 5) and philosophers (e.g., Kidd 2016, 12-13 and Rosenberg 
2011, 307) on both sides of the scientism debate in thinking about knowledge as the scholarly 
work or research produced in scientific fields of study, such as the natural sciences, as opposed 
                                               
6 See also “The Friendship Bench” project: https://www.friendshipbenchzimbabwe.org/.  
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to non-scientific fields of study, such as the humanities, whereas Brown insists on thinking about 
philosophical knowledge as personal knowledge. To anyone who wishes to defend philosophy's 
place in research universities alongside academic disciplines, such as history, linguistics, and 
physics, armed with this conception of philosophy as a “self-improvement” activity, I would use 
Brown’s (2017b, 30) words to say, “good luck with that project!” A much more promising 
strategy, I propose, is for philosophy to embrace scientific ways of knowing and for philosophers 
to incorporate scientific methods into their research.7 
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